Meloni’s Court Reform: Efficiency or Political Control?
March 17, 2026
Introduction
Judicial reform has become a contested issue in Italian politics, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni placing institutional changes at the center of her political agenda.
Supporters argue that the proposal can strengthen the impartiality of courts and clarify responsibilities. Critics warn that judicial independence may be weakened and that politicization would increase.
As Italy prepares for a referendum, the issue has evolved from a technical legal debate into a political test for the government ahead of the 2027 elections.
The Three Pillars of the New Reform
On October 30, 2025, the Italian Parliament approved a constitutional amendment introducing changes to the judiciary, which will be submitted to a national referendum on March 22-23, 2026.
Currently, Italy operates a unified career system in which judges and prosecutors are recruited through the same national examination. Both belong to the Superior Council of the Judiciary. Magistrates can switch roles early in their careers (Ionta & Braun, 2026).
The proposed amendment consists of three main measures. First, it would formally separate judges and prosecutors, creating distinct career paths and two governing councils.
Second, disciplinary powers would be transferred from the councils to a new High Disciplinary Court.
Third, the plan introduces a lottery-based selection mechanism for certain magistrate members of the governing bodies to reduce internal political factions within the judiciary (Gentile & Mazzotti, 2026).
The Government’s Case for Reform
The initiative is supported by Meloni’s coalition government, which sees it as a response to structural problems within Italy’s judicial system. According to Meloni, problems in the judiciary prevent effective migration control and security policies. “When justice doesn’t work, no one can do anything,” she has argued (Roberts, 2026). She added that the objective is “to make the justice system more modern, more meritocratic, more autonomous, more responsible” (Burdeau, 2026).
The government also argues that the reform tackles corporatism, factionalism, and left-wing politicization in the judiciary.
Carlo Nordio, Italy’s Justice Minister, urged the opposition to support the changes because the transformation “will benefit them too, should they come to power” (Puleo, 2025).
A Threat to Judicial Independence?
The proposal risks increasing political pressure on magistrates. Alfredo D’Attorre from the center-left Democratic Party said that “the prime minister, in contradiction to her commitment not to involve the government in the referendum, has thrown herself headlong into the campaign”. Instead of addressing structural issues, Meloni focuses on avoiding political defeat.
The reform does not address the problem of lengthy trials and difficulties prosecuting high-level corruption. The lottery system contradicts merit-based selection criteria. Critics also argue that the reform could blur the boundaries between political authority and judicial autonomy. For instance, after a Rome court ruled against Italy’s migration agreement with Albania, Meloni accused judges of politicization. Nordio has insisted that “magistrates cannot criticise bills.”
In addition, preventing judges and prosecutors from switching roles is unlikely to have a major impact. The 2022 Cartabia reform already allows magistrates to switch roles only once in their careers. Between 2022 and 2024, fewer than 1% of magistrates switched roles. Specifically, 42 out of 8,817 did so in 2024.
Road to 2027: The Referendum as a Defining Political Test
Meloni is capitalizing on dissatisfaction with judicial inefficiency to challenge constitutional constraints. In 2024, 36% of the Italian population and 42% of companies perceived the level of independence of courts and judges to be “fairly good or very good”, which is relatively low (European Commission, 2024).
Nevertheless, the reform is a political gamble and a test of Meloni’s popularity. Projections indicate that with an estimated turnout of 57.7%, the “No” camp leads with 51.5% compared to 48.6% for the “Yes” camp. The right does not have enough resources to mobilize support for “Yes” This could undermine Meloni’s authority and strengthen the opposition. While a successful referendum could enhance political stability, it may also raise concerns about democratic backsliding in Italy.
Conclusion
Meloni’s judicial reform has become a controversial government initiative. The upcoming referendum will serve not only as a decision on legal reform but also as a broader political judgment on Meloni’s leadership. Its outcome may play a significant role ahead of the 2027 elections.